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Privatization and purchase of service contracting (POSC) are generally
considered to be two of the most importantfactors that have helped shape
the human service system during the 1970s and 1980s (Gilbert, 1983,
1986; Kammerman, 1983; Demone and Gibelman, 1984, 1989; Weddell,
1986; Kettner and Martin, 1985; Termell, 1987; Rein, 1989). Therefore,
as we enter the decade of the 1990s, it would seem both appropriate
and worthwhile to reflect on the original expectations for privatization
and POSC and to assess the extent to which these expectations have
been realized.

Early Expectations For Privatization
Long before the concept of privatization became popular,
Peter Drucker was extolling its advantages. "The purpose of
government," he stated, "is to make fundamental decisions, and
to make them effectively. The purpose of government is to focus
the political energies of a society. It is to dramatize issues. It is
to present choices. The purpose of government, in other words,
is to govern" (Drucker, 1969, p. 233). Drucker argued that government should have only a limited role in actual program and
service delivery because, he believed, these functions could be
better performed by the private sector.
Drucker believed that private enterprise could demand results, while government could not. Private sector employees, he
argued, could be held to standards, while public employees enjoyed civil service protection. Publicly delivered programs and
services once begun, he maintained, were likely to be continued
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regardless of need, efficiency, or effectiveness, while privately
delivered programs and services could be terminated if they
proved inefficient or ineffective or when needs changed. Finally,
he maintained that the private sector rewarded performance,
while the public sector rewarded loyalty.
Writing somewhat later, Fitch advanced several additional
arguments for believing that the private sector was inherently
more efficient than the public sector (Fitch, 1974). First, he
maintained that public,sector organizations are not subject to the
same pressures and demands to produce products and services
as are private sector organizations. Consequently, he argued,
public sector organizations are more prone to the instinct to
survive and grow regardless of need. Second, according to Fitch,
the outputs of private sector organizations tend to be clearly
defined products and services, while the outputs of public organizations tend to be more nebulous. Third, he argued, the
objectives of public sector organizations tend to be defined by
government administrators rather than by consumers as in a
competitive marketplace.
To summarize, the expectations of these two early privatization advocates were that greater private sector involvement
in the delivery of public programs and services would lead
to: (1) more emphasis on performance and less emphasis on
conducting business-as-usual; (2) more emphasis on rational
decision making and less emphasis on political decision making; and (3) more emphasis on accountability and consumer
preferences and less emphasis on the preferences of public administrators.
The early privatization advocates represented a clear ideological perspective; the problem is the failure of government
organizations to achieve excellence; the solution is the selfcorrecting mechanisms found in the private sector. The early
privatization advocates appeared to believe that all things are
possible if only the creative and innovative talents of the private
sector are unleashed.
Early Expectations For POSC
The early purchase of service contracting (POSC) advocates
were less ideological and more cautious about private sector
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involvement in the delivery of publicly financed human services. The early POSC advocates also tended to see contracting
as primarily an administrative tool. Two writers, Wedemeyer
and Lourie, are representative of the different approach taken
by the early POSC advocates.
Wedemeyer (1970), speaking at the first conference on POSC
in the human services, suggested that the attractiveness of POSC
rested on a number of untested assumptions:
1. that specifically definable end products could be produced, requisitioned and delivered in quantifiable units,
2. that readily available and qualified sources of supply
existed to produce the number of units required,
3. that some identifiable and describable policy objectives,
outcomes, or purposes existed to which the purchase
could be specifically related,
4. that purchasing organizations have the responsibility for
providing the means for obtaining the purchased products on behalf of their users (clients), and
5. that measures of performance and quality should be identified, defined, and enforced for the protection of both the
purchaser and the client (Wedemeyer, 1970, p. 7).
Speaking at the first national conference on POSC in the
human services, Lourie suggested that the widespread use of
POSC might well redefine the basic relationships between the
public and private human service sectors. Lourie expressed
a vision of a more integrated public/private human service
sector, but with clearly delineated roles for each sector. "The
government has a central role in assuring adequate standards
for citizens who need and use social services and in providing
reasonable regulations for providers. The voluntary sector has a
corresponding obligation to support high standards for public
personnel and adequate administrative resources so that the
public agency can afford to be less rigid and do its job well"
(Lourie, 1979, p. 21).
Lourie went on to outline some basic principles that he
believed should govern the use of POSC:
1. public funds should be available on equal terms to all
persons in the same circumstances,
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2. the services provided by contractors should be clearly
defined,
3. government should set service standards and through
monitoring hold contractors to the standards, and
4. payments to contractors should be restricted to prior
uniformly determined direct costs and whatever indirect
costs are appropriate. Equitable and uniform rates should
be paid to all contractors rendering essentially the same
services (Lourie, 1979, p. 22-23).

To summarize, the expectations of the early POSC advocates were quite different than those of the early privatization
advocates. In particular, the private sector was not seen as
inherently superior to the public sector and POSC was seen
as essentially an administrative tool, not an ideological one.
Additionally, some sentiment existed that POSC might lead
to greater cooperation between the public and private human
service systems.
POSC In the 1990s
In examining POSC practices in the 1990s, we are interested
in determining if the perspectives of either the early privatization advocates or the early POSC advocates have come to
pass. To examine POSC practices in the 1990s, we conceptualize
six major approaches to contracting: (1) the funding and fiscal
considerations approach, (2) the political approach, (3) the continuation of business-as-usual approach, (4) the planning and
control approach, (5) the service volume approach, and (6) the
client outcomes approach. This categorical schema is based on
a review of the major national studies of POSC conducted over
the last two decades including the authors' own work (BoozAllen and Hamilton, 1971; Wedel, 1974; Benton, Field and Millar, 1978; Pacific Consultants, 1979; APWA, 1981; Kettner and
Martin, 1986).
The Funding & Fiscal ConsiderationsApproach
Early POSC activity was frequently motivated by the desire to maximize the public and private resources available for
human services. By combining state funding with "matching
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funds" provided by non-profit agencies under POSC contracts,
federal Title XX funds could be leveraged. With the advent of
the Social Services Block Grant, the matching funds requirement
was eliminated along with the fiscal incentive to use POSC.
Nevertheless, the widespread use of POSC over the years appears to have resulted in the public and private human services
systems becoming more integrated and more financially interdependent. Research suggests that many non-profit human service
agencies today are heavily reliant on POSC for their continued
existence (e.g., Terrell, 1987). This situation may continue well
into the future.
The major objective of the funding and fiscal considerations
approach is to use POSC as a mechanism to coordinate and
maximize public and private resources for human services.
The Political Approach
A second approach to POSC focuses on being responsive
to the political variable. A variety of interest groups tend to
emerge around POSC systems (DeHoog, 1986; Kramer and
Grossman, 1987; Kettner and Martin, 1989). Advocacy groups,
state and local government officials, contractors, unions, and
others all have vested interests in who gets what, when, and
how as the result of POSC decisions. Kramer and Grossman
(1987) suggest that political factors are constantly in a state of
tension with technical factors during the POSC decision process.
The salience of the political variable in POSC decision making
has also been documented in a small number of other studies (e.g., Terrell and Examer, 1984; DeHoog, 1986; Kettner and
Martin, 1989).
The major objective of the political approach to POSC is
to be responsive to such considerations as power, authority,
influence, and the pervasiveness and persuasiveness of various
interest groups.
The Business-As-Usual Approach
Most POSC systems have now been in existence for almost
two decades. It is possible that many of these POSC systems today have well developed government/ contractor relationships
that have been strengthened over time. If this is true, then a
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shared public/private service delivery system may well be the
new human services status quo.
The business-as-usual approach to POSC focuses primarily
on the technical aspects of contracting. Infusion of competition
or the involvement of new contractors is not an issue. Considerable time and energy is spent on issuing requests for proposals
(RFPs), negotiating and awarding contracts, monitoring contractors, and record keeping, but with essentially the same cadre of
contractors year-in and year-out.
The major objective of the business-as-usual approach to
POSC is to maintain the current pattern of POSC relationships
and the stability of the contracting system that has developed
over time.
The Planning & Control Approach
Rational planning includes such activities as needs assessments; the allocation of resources based on the identified needs,
the establishment of goals and objectives, program design, intervention, monitoring, evaluation, and others (Kettner, Moroney,
and Martin, 1990; Kettner and Martin, 1987). The planning and
control approach enables government contracting agencies to
better respond to changing needs. This approach assumes that
contractors will be replaced from time-to-time as needs change
and suggests that POSC dollars should not be viewed by contractors as a predictable revenue source.
The major objective of the planning and control approach to
POSC is to use contracting to target specifically identified needs
as part of an overall human services plan.
The Service Volume Approach
The service volume approach to POSC, as well as the client
outcomes approach, to be discussed next, are both forms of
performance contracting. The service volume approach can also
be thought of as unit cost contracting, efficiency contracting,
or output contracting. The service volume approach is also
considered a more market oriented process in that a rate of
exchange is established for the services provided (Hatry and
Durman, 1985; Kettner and Martin, 1990).
The major objective of the service volume approach to POSC
is to focus the contractor's attention on efficiency considerations
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and on the delivery of units of service (e.g., one hour, one
meal, one trip, one encounter, etc.) by tying all, or a portion of,
the contractor's compensation to the amount of service actually
provided.
The Client Outcomes Approach
Contracting for outcomes represents a further refinement of
the performance concept. In the client outcomes approach to
POSC, the emphasis on performance shifts from considerations
of efficiency to considerations of effectiveness and the impact of
services on clients. Contracting for a specified volume of service,
such as a series of parent training classes for abusing parents,
establishes a clearly defined buyer-seller relationship. Contracting for outcomes, such as improved parent-child relationship
and no further reports of abuse, extends the buyer-seller relationship in that the buyer pays only for the results achieved by
the seller. As the field of outcome measures has become more
developed in recent years, some state human services agencies
have begun experimenting with their use (Wedel and Colston,
1987; Kuechler, Velasquez, and White, 1988).
The major objective of the client outcomes approach to POSC
is to focus the contractor's attention on the results of service
provision through the use of measures of client impact and by
tying all, or a portion of, the contractor's compensation to the
achievement of client outcomes.
Based upon their major objectives, these six approaches to
POSC can be classified as being more reflective of the expectations of either the early privatization advocates or the early
POSC advocates:
POSC Approach
" Funding & Fiscal Considerations
" Planning & Controlling the System
* Business-As-Usual
" Service Volume
" Client Outcomes
" Politics & External Pressures

More Reflective of Early
Expectations for
POSC
POSC
POSC
Privatization
Privatization
Neutral
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To the extent that the POSC approaches being utilized today are
more reflective of either the early privatization expectations or
the early POSC expectations, we can determine which alternative expectation has come to pass.
The Study
To ascertain the extent to which the six different approaches
to POSC are being pursued by the human services today an
exploratory study was undertaken in late 1990.
Study Design
The study focused on five programs in ten states. The study
was designed to explore POSC practices using the program
as the unit of analysis. The five programs selected for study
were: (1) alcohol, drug and mental health, (2) child day care,
(3) employment and training, (4) residential treatment, and
(5) specialized transportation for the physically disabled. These
programs were selected because they represent both "soft" services (difficult to define) and "hard" services (clear operational
referents).
A purposeful sample of 10 study states was selected from
among the 34 states that constitute state administered welfare systems. State supervised/local government administered
welfare systems were excluded from the study population
due to the potential confounding nature of the level of government variable. Other considerations in state selection included geographical representation and significant involvement
in POSC. The ten states ultimately selected were: Arizona,
Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, North Dakota, Washington, West Virginia, Utah, and Vermont.
Implementation of the Study
Mail surveys were sent to the chief program administrators
of each of the five programs in the ten study states. The surveys
asked program administrators to rate the relative importance of
six factors on their POSC decisions. These six POSC decision
factors represent operationalizations of the six approaches to
POSC identified earlier: (1) funding and fiscal considerations,
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(2) politics and external influences, (3) continuation of businessas-usual, (4) planning and controlling the system, (5) contractor
performance in achievement of a specified volume of services,
and (6) contractor performance in achieving client outcomes.
Survey respondents were asked to rank order the six decision factors according to their relative influence on their programs' overall POSC decisions. Twenty-one useful surveys were
received constituting a response rate of 42 percent. Table 1
itemizes the responses by program and by state. Some programs
and states are over represented in the sample, others underrepresented. The largest number of program responses (7) are from
alcohol, drug, and mental health programs. The largest number
of responses from one state is three.
Table 1
Survey Responses by Program & State
Program
Alcohol, Drug Abuse &
Mental Health
Child Day Care
Employment & Training
Specialized Transportation
Residential Treatment

Total Responses

No. of
Responses
7
4
4
3
3

21

State

No. of
Responses

Arizona
Florida
Kansas
Louisiana
Massachusetts
North Dakota

1
3
3
1
2
3

Washington
West Virginia
Utah
Vermont

2
3
1
2
21

Data Analysis
Table 2 shows the relative importance of the six POSC decisions factors for all programs combined and for each program
individually. The data analysis is first directed toward a discussion of the relative importance of the six POSC decision factors

98

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

for all programs combined. With a mean score of 5.01, funding
and fiscal considerations is clearly the most important POSC
decision factor overall. The other five POSC decision factors are
considerably less important being tightly grouped in a range
from 3.10 to 3.52. The two privatization oriented approaches
(service volume considerations and client outcome considerations) appear to be relatively unimportant in the overall POSC
decisions of the five combined programs. Service volume considerations (3.19) ranks fifth only slightly ahead of the least
important POSC decision factor, politics and external pressures
(3.10). Client outcomes which ranks third is still only marginal
in overall importance (3.43).
The discussion of Table 2 now shifts to the relative importance of the six POSC decision factors for each of the five
programs individually. Mean scores are again used as the basis
for comparison. The discussion focuses first on identifying any
patterns in the data. To aid in this analysis, the first and second
most important POSC decision factors for each program are
set off by brackets. With the brackets serving as visual aids,
it is readily apparent that funding and fiscal considerations is
also an important POSC decision factor for all five programs
individually. Funding and fiscal considerations is either the
first or second most important POSC decision factor for all
five programs. No other POSC decision factor evidences such a
consistently strong influence across all programs.
Other POSC decision factors, however, do evidence strong
influence on a program-by-program basis. In particular, client
outcomes is the most important POSC decision factors for the
two "hard" service programs, employment and training and
special transportation. The continuation of business-as-usual approach is also an important POSC decision factors for residential
treatment and child day care programs where continuity of care
is traditionally an important consideration.
Shifting the data analysis to statistical significance, a oneway analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted for each
POSC decision factor across all five programs. The purpose
of the analysis is to ascertain if differences in the relative
importance of POSC decision factors across programs is sufficiently strong to warrant further exploration. The one-way
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ANOVAs prove statistically significant, or approach statistical
significance, only for the two privatization oriented POSC decision factors, service volume and client outcomes. For these
two POSC decision factors, the variation between programs is
greater than the variation within programs. This finding suggests that systematic differences exist in the relative importance
that "hard" and "soft" service programs assign to these two
privatization oriented POSC decision factors. Service volume
and client outcomes appear to be considerably more important
in the POSC decisions of the two "hard" service programs,
employment and training and specialized transportation, than
for the other three "soft" service programs. While the data
themselves do not suggest any explanations for this finding,
these two "hard" service programs may simply lend themselves
more readily to quantification in terms of service volume (e.g.,
the number of training sessions, the number of trips) and client
outcomes (e.g., job placements) than do the other "soft" service programs.
Summary & Conclusion
What then can be said about POSC in the 1990s? Have the
expectations of either the early privatization advocates or the
early POSC advocates come to pass? While any speculations
must be qualified due to the exploratory nature of the research
and the small size of the study sample, the data do suggest
some conclusions.
The early privatization advocates held expectations for some
fairly substantial changes in the way human services would
be delivered. Their expectations included more emphasis on
performance and less emphasis on politics and conducting
business-as-usual. Early POSC advocates had a different set
of expectations. Their expectations included more of a focus
on the administrative aspects of POSC and a desire to see
greater cooperation between the public and private human service sectors. If these descriptions constitute fair characterizations of the early expectations for privatization and POSC, then
the former had hopes for a system that would operate much
like a market economy while the later hoped for a more of a
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partnership arrangement between the public and private human
service sectors.
The clear theme that emerges from this study is that overall
POSC decision making is dominated by funding and fiscal considerations. The funding and fiscal considerations approach is
identified as being more closely associated with the expectations
of the early POSC advocates than with the early privatization
advocates. Thus, it would appear that at least some of the
expectations of the early POSC advocates have been realized.
When the relative importance of POSC decision factors are
looked at on a program-by-program basis, however, a different
picture emerges. Funding and fiscal considerations is still the
most important overall POSC decision factor for the "soft" service programs, but client outcomes becomes the most important
POSC decision factor for the "hard" service programs. The client
outcomes approach is identified as being more closely associated with the expectations of the early privatization advocates.
Thus, it appears that at least some of the expectations of the
early privatization advocates have also been realized. While
more research is clearly needed to substantiate these findings, it
appears that POSC involving "soft" services has developed in
accordance with the expectations of the early POSC advocates,
while POSC for "hard services" appears to have developed
more in accordance with the expectations of the early privatization advocates.
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